| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15527 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15527 |
| Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe | |
| Daniel S. Hamermesh; Gerard A. Pfann | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-11-19 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of the market for individual reputation, an indicator of regard by one's peers and others. The central questions are: 1) Does the quantity of exposures raise reputation independent of their quality? and 2) Assuming that overall quality matters for reputation, does the quality of an individual's most important exposure have an extra effect on reputation? Using evidence for academic economists, we find that, conditional on its impact, the quantity of output has no or even a negative effect on each of a number of proxies for reputation, and very little evidence that a scholar's most influential work provides any extra enhancement of reputation. Quality ranking matters more than absolute quality. Data on mobility and salaries show, on the contrary, substantial positive effects of quantity, independent of quality. We test various explanations for the differences between the determinants of reputation and salary. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15527 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573203 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daniel S. Hamermesh,Gerard A. Pfann. Markets for Reputation: Evidence on Quality and Quantity in Academe. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15527.pdf（306KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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