| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15540 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15540 |
| Bayesian Persuasion | |
| Emir Kamenica; Matthew Gentzkow | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-11-19 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender and Receiver defined by an information structure and a message technology. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a persuasion mechanism that strictly benefits Sender. We characterize the optimal mechanism. Finally, we analyze several examples that illustrate the applicability of our results. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15540 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573216 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Emir Kamenica,Matthew Gentzkow. Bayesian Persuasion. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15540.pdf（1042KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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