| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15543 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15543 |
| Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty | |
| Nicholas E. Burger; Charles D. Kolstad | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-11-24 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The literature on voluntary provision of public goods includes recent theoretical work on the formation of voluntary coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition size. We find that contributions decrease when public good returns are uncertain but increase when individuals can form a coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good benefits are higher. Uncertainty has no effect on coalition size. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Public Goods ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15543 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573219 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicholas E. Burger,Charles D. Kolstad. Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15543.pdf（354KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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