| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15567 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15567 |
| Crisis Resolution and Bank Liquidity | |
| Viral V. Acharya; Hyun Song Shin; Tanju Yorulmazer | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-12-03 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | What is the effect of financial crises and their resolution on banks' choice of liquid asset holdings? When risky assets have limited pledgeability and banks have relative expertise in employing risky assets, the market for these assets clears only at fire-sale prices following a large number of bank failures. The gains from acquiring assets at fire-sale prices make it attractive for banks to hold liquid assets. We show that the resulting choice of bank liquidity is counter-cyclical, inefficiently low during economic booms but excessively high during crises, and present and discuss evidence consistent with these predictions. Since inefficient users may enter asset markets when prices fall sufficiently, interventions to resolve banking crises may be desirable ex post. However, policies aimed at resolving crises affect ex-ante bank liquidity in subtle ways: while liquidity support to failed banks or unconditional support to surviving banks in acquiring failed banks give banks incentives to hold less liquidity, support to surviving banks that is conditional on their liquid asset holdings creates incentives for banks to hold more liquidity. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15567 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573243 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral V. Acharya,Hyun Song Shin,Tanju Yorulmazer. Crisis Resolution and Bank Liquidity. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15567.pdf（454KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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