| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15568 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15568 |
| The Internal Governance of Firms | |
| Viral V. Acharya; Stewart C. Myers; Raghuram Rajan | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-12-03 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of internal governance where the self-serving actions of top management are limited by the potential reaction of subordinates. Internal governance can mitigate agency problems and ensure that firms have substantial value, even with little or no external governance by investors. External governance, even if crude and uninformed, can complement internal governance and improve efficiency. This leads to a theory of investment and dividend policy, where dividends are paid by self-interested CEOs to maintain a balance between internal and external control. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15568 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573244 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral V. Acharya,Stewart C. Myers,Raghuram Rajan. The Internal Governance of Firms. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15568.pdf（442KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
