| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15569 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15569 |
| Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking | |
| Viral V. Acharya; Yakov Amihud; Lubomir Litov | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-12-03 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze the link between creditor rights and firms' investment policies, proposing that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. In cross-country analysis, we find that stronger creditor rights induce greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying acquisitions, which result in poorer operating and stock-market abnormal performance. In countries with strong creditor rights, firms also have lower cash flow risk and lower leverage, and there is greater propensity of firms with low-recovery assets to acquire targets with high-recovery assets. These relationships are strongest in countries where management is dismissed in reorganization, and are observed in time-series analysis around changes in creditor rights. Our results question the value of strong creditor rights as they have an adverse effect on firms by inhibiting management from undertaking risky investments. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15569 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573245 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral V. Acharya,Yakov Amihud,Lubomir Litov. Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15569.pdf（394KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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