| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15575 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15575 |
| Banking System Control, Capital Allocation, and Economy Performance | |
| Randall Morck; M. Deniz Yavuz; Bernard Yeung | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-12-10 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We observe less efficient capital allocation in countries whose banking systems are more thoroughly controlled by tycoons or families. The magnitude of this effect is similar to that of state control over banking. Unlike state control, tycoon or family control also correlates with slower economic and productivity growth, greater financial instability, and worse income inequality. These findings are consistent with theories that elite-capture of a country's financial system can embed "crony capitalism". |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15575 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573251 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Randall Morck,M. Deniz Yavuz,Bernard Yeung. Banking System Control, Capital Allocation, and Economy Performance. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15575.pdf（324KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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