| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15597 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15597 |
| Migration and the Welfare State: A Dynamic Political-Economy Theory | |
| Assaf Razin; Efraim Sadka; Benjarong Suwankiri | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-12-17 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a dynamic politico-economic theory of welfare state and immigration policies, featuring three groups of voters: skilled workers, unskilled workers, and old retirees. The welfare-state is modeled by a proportional tax on labor income to finance a demogrant in a balanced-budget manner to capture the essence of inter- and intra- generational redistribution of a typical welfare system. Migrants arrive when young and their birth rate exceeds the native-born birth rate. We characterize political-economic equilibrium policy rules consisting of the tax rate, the skill composition of migrants, and the total number of migrants, in terms of demographic and labor productivity characteristics. We find that political coalitions will form among skilled and unskilled voters or among unskilled and old voters in order to block the other group from coming into power. As a consequence, the ideal policies of the unskilled voters are featured more often in the political economy equilibria than any other groups regardless of the size of unskilled voters. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15597 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573273 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Assaf Razin,Efraim Sadka,Benjarong Suwankiri. Migration and the Welfare State: A Dynamic Political-Economy Theory. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15597.pdf（418KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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