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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w15603 |
来源ID | Working Paper 15603 |
The Effects of Product Liability Exemption in the Presence of the FDA | |
Tomas J. Philipson; Eric C. Sun; Dana Goldman | |
发表日期 | 2009-12-23 |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | In the United States, drugs are jointly regulated by the US Food and Drug Administration, which oversees premarket clinical trials designed to ensure drug safety and efficacy, and the liability system, which allows patients to sue manufacturers for unsafe drugs. In this paper, we examine the potential welfare effects of this dual system aimed at ensuring the safety of medical products, and conclude that product liability exemptions for FDA regulated activities could raise economic efficiency. We show that while reductions in liability, such those associated with pre-emption, may lower welfare in the absence of the FDA, they may raise welfare in its presence. In the presence of the FDA, product liability may reduce efficiency by raising prices without pushing firms, who are already bound by the agency's requirements, to invest further in product safety. We consider as a case study the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, which sharply reduced vaccine manufacturer's liability in 1988. We find evidence that the program reduced prices without affecting vaccine safety, suggesting that liability reductions can enhance economic efficiency in the presence of the FDA. |
主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Other ; Law and Economics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15603 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573279 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Tomas J. Philipson,Eric C. Sun,Dana Goldman. The Effects of Product Liability Exemption in the Presence of the FDA. 2009. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w15603.pdf(1196KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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