| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15610 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15610 |
| Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction Among Chess Players | |
| Steven D. Levitt; John A. List; Sally E. Sadoff | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-12-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. Much of this evidence, however, is generated using the Centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing the theory. In this study, we analyze the play of world class chess players both in the centipede game and in another class of games - Race to 100 games - that are pure tests of backward induction. We find that world class chess players behave like student subjects in the centipede game, virtually never playing the backward induction equilibrium In the race to 100 games, in contrast, we find that many chess players properly backward induct. Consistent with our claim that the Centipede game is not a useful test of backward induction, we find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15610 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573286 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Steven D. Levitt,John A. List,Sally E. Sadoff. Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction Among Chess Players. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15610.pdf（155KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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