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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w15643
来源IDWorking Paper 15643
Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers: Evidence from City Treasurers
Alexander Whalley
发表日期2010-01-07
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要This paper investigates whether methods of public official selection affect policymaking in cities. I draw on the unique characteristics of California's city referendum process to identify the causal effect of city treasurers' method of selection on their cities' debt management policies. I utilize a regression discontinuity strategy based on the effect of narrowly-passing appointive city treasurer referendums on city borrowing costs. The results indicate that appointive treasurers reduce a city's cost of borrowing by 13% to 23%. The results imply that if all cities in California with elected treasurers were to appoint them, total borrowing expenditures would be reduced by more than $20 million per year. Appointive city treasurers appear to reduce borrowing costs primarily through the refinancing of expensive debt at lower interest rates.
主题Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Subnational Fiscal Issues
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w15643
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573318
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GB/T 7714
Alexander Whalley. Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers: Evidence from City Treasurers. 2010.
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