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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w15643 |
来源ID | Working Paper 15643 |
Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers: Evidence from City Treasurers | |
Alexander Whalley | |
发表日期 | 2010-01-07 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper investigates whether methods of public official selection affect policymaking in cities. I draw on the unique characteristics of California's city referendum process to identify the causal effect of city treasurers' method of selection on their cities' debt management policies. I utilize a regression discontinuity strategy based on the effect of narrowly-passing appointive city treasurer referendums on city borrowing costs. The results indicate that appointive treasurers reduce a city's cost of borrowing by 13% to 23%. The results imply that if all cities in California with elected treasurers were to appoint them, total borrowing expenditures would be reduced by more than $20 million per year. Appointive city treasurers appear to reduce borrowing costs primarily through the refinancing of expensive debt at lower interest rates. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Subnational Fiscal Issues |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15643 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573318 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Whalley. Elected Versus Appointed Policymakers: Evidence from City Treasurers. 2010. |
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w15643.pdf(382KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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