| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15666 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15666 |
| Heterogeneous Harm vs. Spatial Spillovers: Environmental Federalism and US Air Pollution | |
| H. Spencer Banzhaf; B. Andrew Chupp | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-21 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The economics of environmental federalism identifies two book-end departures from the first-best, which equates marginal costs and benefits in all local jurisdictions. Local governments may respond to local conditions, but ignore inter-jurisdictional spillovers. Alternatively, central governments may internalize spillovers, but impose uniform regulations ignoring local hetero-geneity. We provide a simple model that demonstrates that the choice of policy depends crucial-ly on the shape of marginal abatement costs. If marginal costs are increasing and convex, then abatement cost elasticities will tend to be higher around the local policies. This increases the deadweight loss of those policies relative to the centralized policy, ceteris paribus. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15666 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573339 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | H. Spencer Banzhaf,B. Andrew Chupp. Heterogeneous Harm vs. Spatial Spillovers: Environmental Federalism and US Air Pollution. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15666.pdf（690KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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