| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15689 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15689 |
| Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Voluntary Health Insurance in Europe | |
| Kristian Bolin; Daniel Hedblom; Anna Lindgren; Bjorn Lindgren | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-28 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Several past studies have found health risk to be negatively correlated with the probability of voluntary health insurance. This is contrary to what one would expect from standard textbook models of adverse selection and moral hazard. The two most common explanations to the counter-intuitive result are either (1) that risk-aversion is correlated with health -- i.e. that healthier individuals are also more risk-averse -- or (2) that insurers are able to discriminate among customers based on observable health-risk characteristics. We revisited these arguments, using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). Self-assessed health served as an indicator of risk: better health, lower risk. We did, indeed, observe a negative correlation between risk and insurance but found no evidence of heterogeneous risk-preferences as an explanation to our finding. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15689 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573362 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kristian Bolin,Daniel Hedblom,Anna Lindgren,et al. Asymmetric Information and the Demand for Voluntary Health Insurance in Europe. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15689.pdf（283KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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