| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15695 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15695 |
| Pay-to-Bid Auctions | |
| Brennan C. Platt; Joseph Price; Henry Tappen | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-28 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a new auction format in which bidders pay a fee each time they increase the auction price. Bidding fees are the primary source of revenue for the seller, but produce the same expected revenue as standard auctions. Our model predicts a particular distribution of ending prices, which we test against observed auction data. Our model fits the data well for over three-fourths of routinely auctioned items. The notable exceptions are video game paraphernalia, which show more aggressive bidding and higher expected revenue. By incorporating mild risk-loving preferences in the model, we explain nearly all of the auctions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; General Equilibrium |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15695 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573368 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Brennan C. Platt,Joseph Price,Henry Tappen. Pay-to-Bid Auctions. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15695.pdf（429KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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