| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15705 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15705 |
| The Political Resource Curse | |
| Fernanda Brollo; Tommaso Nannicini; Roberto Perotti; Guido Tabellini | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-28 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Subnational Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15705 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573378 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fernanda Brollo,Tommaso Nannicini,Roberto Perotti,et al. The Political Resource Curse. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15705.pdf（2072KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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