| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15719 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15719 |
| Consumption Risk-sharing in Social Networks | |
| Attila Ambrus; Markus Mobius; Adam Szeidl | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-02-04 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model of informal risk-sharing in social networks, where relationships between individuals can be used as social collateral to enforce insurance payments. We characterize incentive compatible risk-sharing arrangements and obtain two results. (1) The degree of informal insurance is governed by the expansiveness of the network, measured by the number of connections that groups of agents have with the rest of the community, relative to group size. Two-dimensional networks, where people have connections in multiple directions, are sufficiently expansive to allow very good risk-sharing. We show that social networks in Peruvian villages satisfy this dimensionality property; thus, our model can explain Townsend's (1994) puzzling observation that village communities often exhibit close to full insurance. (2) In second-best arrangements, agents organize in endogenous "risk-sharing islands" in the network, where shocks are shared fully within, but imperfectly across islands. As a result, network based risk-sharing is local: socially closer agents insure each other more. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15719 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573393 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Attila Ambrus,Markus Mobius,Adam Szeidl. Consumption Risk-sharing in Social Networks. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15719.pdf（1922KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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