| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15779 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15779 |
| Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited | |
| Robert S. Gibbons; Richard T. Holden; Michael L. Powell | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-02-25 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a rational-expectations model of price formation in an intermediate-good market under uncertainty. There is a continuum of dyads, each consisting of an upstream party and a downstream party. Both parties can make specific investments at private cost, and there is a machine that either party can own. As in property-rights models, different ownership structures create different incentives for the parties' investments. As in rational-expectations models, some parties may invest in acquiring information, which is then incorporated into the market-clearing price by the parties' trading behaviors. The informativeness of the price mechanism affects the returns to specific investments and hence the optimal ownership structure for individual dyads; meanwhile, the ownership choices by individual dyads affect the informativeness of the price mechanism. In equilibrium the informativeness of the price mechanism can induce ex ante homogenous dyads to choose heterogeneous ownership structures. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15779 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573452 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert S. Gibbons,Richard T. Holden,Michael L. Powell. Integration and Information: Markets and Hierarchies Revisited. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15779.pdf（358KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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