| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15783 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15783 |
| Rational-Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Good Markets | |
| Robert S. Gibbons; Richard T. Holden; Michael L. Powell | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-02-25 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a rational-expectations model of information acquisition and price formation in an intermediate- good market: prices and net supply are non-negative, there are no noise traders, and the intermediate good has multiple potential uses. Several of our results differ from the classic Grossman-Stiglitz approach. For example, the price mechanism is more informative at high and low prices and potentially uninformative at middle prices. Also, an informed trade by a producer of one final good amounts to a noise trade from the perspective of a producer of another final good, so (a) as the price mechanism becomes more informative for producers of one final good, it becomes less informative for producers of others, who therefore have a stronger incentive to acquire information, so information acquisition has the strategic-complements property between groups, and (b) having more producers (in multiple groups) become informed need not increase the informativeness of the price mechanism. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15783 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573456 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert S. Gibbons,Richard T. Holden,Michael L. Powell. Rational-Expectations Equilibrium in Intermediate Good Markets. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15783.pdf（252KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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