| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15837 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15837 |
| Leverage, Moral Hazard and Liquidity | |
| Viral V. Acharya; S. Viswanathan | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-03-25 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We build a model of the financial sector to explain why adverse asset shocks in good economic times lead to a sudden drying up of liquidity. Financial firms raise short-term debt in order to finance asset purchases. When asset fundamentals worsen, debt induces firms to risk-shift; this limits their funding liquidity and their ability to roll over debt. Firms may de-lever by selling assets to better-capitalized firms. Thus the market liquidity of assets depends on the severity of the asset shock and the system-wide distribution of leverage. This distribution of leverage is, however, itself endogenous to future prospects. In particular, short-term debt is relatively cheap to issue in good times when expectations of asset fundamentals are benign, resulting in entry to the financial sector of firms with less capital or high leverage. Due to such entry, even though the incidence of financial crises is lower in good times, their severity in terms of de-leveraging and evaporation of market liquidity can in fact be greater. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15837 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573510 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Viral V. Acharya,S. Viswanathan. Leverage, Moral Hazard and Liquidity. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15837.pdf（517KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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