| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15899 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15899 |
| Optimal Emission Pricing in the Presence of International Spillovers: Decomposing Leakage and Terms-of-Trade Motives | |
| Christoph Böhringer; Andreas Lange; Thomas F. Rutherford | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-04-09 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Carbon control policies in OECD countries commonly differentiate emission prices in favor of energy-intensive industries. While leakage provides a efficiency argument for differential emission pricing, the latter may be a disguised beggar-thy-neighbor policy to exploit terms of trade. Using an optimal tax framework, we propose a method to decompose the leakage motive and the terms-of-trade motive for emission price differentiation. We illustrate our method with a quantitative impact assessment of unilateral climate policies for the U.S. and EU economies. We conclude in these instances that complex optimal emission price differentiation does not substantially reduce the overall economic costs of carbon abatement compared with a simple rule of uniform emission pricing. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Energy ; Regional and Urban Economics ; Regional Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15899 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573574 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christoph Böhringer,Andreas Lange,Thomas F. Rutherford. Optimal Emission Pricing in the Presence of International Spillovers: Decomposing Leakage and Terms-of-Trade Motives. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15899.pdf（284KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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