| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w15910 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 15910 |
| Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure | |
| Sergey Chernenko; C. Fritz Foley; Robin Greenwood | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-04-15 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Standard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear agency costs and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We show that if equity is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs and can induce a controlling shareholder to list equity. Higher valuations support listings associated with greater agency costs. We test the predictions that follow from this idea on a sample of publicly listed corporate subsidiaries in Japan. When there is greater scope for expropriation by the parent firm, minority shareholders fare poorly after listing. Parent firms often repurchase subsidiaries at large discounts to valuations at the time of listing and experience positive abnormal returns when repurchases are announced. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15910 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573584 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sergey Chernenko,C. Fritz Foley,Robin Greenwood. Agency Costs, Mispricing, and Ownership Structure. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w15910.pdf（315KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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