全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are most needed?

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w15917
来源ID	Working Paper 15917
	The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are most needed?
	Rüdiger Fahlenbrach; Angie Low; René M. Stulz
发表日期	2010-04-15
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	Outside directors have incentives to resign to protect their reputation or to avoid an increase in their workload when they anticipate that the firm on whose board they sit will perform poorly or disclose adverse news. We call these incentives the dark side of outside directors. We find strong support for the existence of this dark side. Following surprise director departures, affected firms have worse stock and operating performance, are more likely to suffer from an extreme negative return event, are more likely to restate earnings, and have a higher likelihood of being named in a federal class action securities fraud lawsuit.
主题	Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w15917
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573591
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Rüdiger Fahlenbrach,Angie Low,René M. Stulz. The dark side of outside directors: Do they quit when they are most needed?. 2010.