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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w15908 |
来源ID | Working Paper 15908 |
Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy | |
John B. Taylor; John C. Williams | |
发表日期 | 2010-04-16 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper focuses on simple rules for monetary policy which central banks have used in various ways to guide their interest rate decisions. Such rules, which can be evaluated using simulation and optimization techniques, were first derived from research on empirical monetary models with rational expectations and sticky prices built in the 1970s and 1980s. During the past two decades substantial progress has been made in establishing that such rules are robust. They perform well with a variety of newer and more rigorous models and policy evaluation methods. Simple rules are also frequently more robust than fully optimal rules. Important progress has also been made in understanding how to adjust simple rules to deal with measurement error and expectations. Moreover, historical experience has shown that simple rules can work well in the real world in that macroeconomic performance has been better when central bank decisions were described by such rules. The recent financial crisis has not changed these conclusions, but it has stimulated important research on how policy rules should deal with asset bubbles and the zero bound on interest rates. Going forward the crisis has drawn attention to the importance of research on international monetary issues and on the implications of discretionary deviations from policy rules. |
主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15908 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573592 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John B. Taylor,John C. Williams. Simple and Robust Rules for Monetary Policy. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w15908.pdf(830KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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