| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w15999
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 15999
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| Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem |
| Patrick Bolton; Martin Oehmke
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| 发表日期 | 2010-05-20
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| 出版年 | 2010
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | Commentators have raised concerns about the empty creditor problem that arises when a debtholder has obtained insurance against default but otherwise retains control rights in and outside bankruptcy. We analyze this problem from an ex-ante and ex-post perspective in a formal model of debt with limited commitment, by comparing contracting outcomes with and without credit default swaps (CDS). We show that CDS, and the empty creditors they give rise to, have important ex-ante commitment benefits: By strengthening creditors' bargaining power they raise the debtor's pledgeable income and help reduce the incidence of strategic default. However, we also show that lenders will over-insure in equilibrium, giving rise to an inefficiently high incidence of costly bankruptcy. We discuss a number of remedies that have been proposed to overcome the inefficiency resulting from excess insurance. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Corporate Finance
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| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w15999
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573673
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Patrick Bolton,Martin Oehmke. Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor Problem. 2010.
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文件名：
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w15999.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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