| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16007 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16007 |
| Diagnosing Consumer Confusion and Sub-Optimal Shopping Effort: Theory and Mortgage-Market Evidence | |
| Susan E. Woodward; Robert E. Hall | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-05-20 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Mortgage loans are leading examples of transactions where experts on one side of the market take advantage of consumers' lack of knowledge and experience. We study the compensation that borrowers pay to mortgage brokers for assistance from application to closing. Two findings support the conclusion that confused borrowers overpay for brokers' services: (1) A model of effective shopping shows that borrowers sacrifice at least $1,000 by shopping from too few brokers. (2) Borrowers who compensate their brokers with both cash and a commission from the lender pay twice as much as similar borrowers who pay no cash. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16007 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573681 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Susan E. Woodward,Robert E. Hall. Diagnosing Consumer Confusion and Sub-Optimal Shopping Effort: Theory and Mortgage-Market Evidence. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16007.pdf（292KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
