| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16028 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16028 |
| Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets | |
| Fuhito Kojima; Parag A. Pathak; Alvin E. Roth | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-05-27 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Accommodating couples has been a longstanding issue in the design of centralized labor market clearinghouses for doctors and psychologists, because couples view pairs of jobs as complements. A stable matching may not exist when couples are present. We find conditions under which a stable matching exists with high probability in large markets. We present a mechanism that finds a stable matching with high probability, and which makes truth-telling by all participants an approximate equilibrium. We relate these theoretical results to the job market for psychologists, in which stable matchings exist for all years of the data, despite the presence of couples. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16028 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573703 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fuhito Kojima,Parag A. Pathak,Alvin E. Roth. Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16028.pdf（609KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
