| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16085 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16085 |
| Competing for Attention in Financial Markets | |
| Bruce Ian Carlin; Shaun William Davies; Andrew Miles Iannaccone | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-06-10 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Competition for positive attention in financial markets frequently resembles a tournament, where superior relative performance and greater visibility are rewarded with convex payoffs. We present a rational expectations model in which firms compete for such positive attention and show that higher competition for this prize makes discretionary disclosure less likely. In the limit when the market is perfectly competitive, transparency is minimized. We show that this effect persists when considering general prize structures, prizes that change in size as a result of competition, endogenous prizes, prizes granted on the basis of percentile, product market competition, and alternative game theoretic formulations. The analysis implies that competition is unreliable as a driver of market transparency and should not be viewed as a panacea that assures self-regulation in financial markets. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; General Equilibrium ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16085 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573760 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bruce Ian Carlin,Shaun William Davies,Andrew Miles Iannaccone. Competing for Attention in Financial Markets. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16085.pdf（345KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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