| 来源类型 | Working Paper
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| 规范类型 | 报告
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| DOI | 10.3386/w16119
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| 来源ID | Working Paper 16119
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| Buy coal? Deposit markets prevent carbon leakage |
| Bård Harstad
|
| 发表日期 | 2010-06-24
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| 出版年 | 2010
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| 语种 | 英语
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| 摘要 | If a coalition of countries implements climate policies, nonparticipants tend to consume more, pollute more, and invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition's equilibrium policy distorts trade and is not time-consistent. This paper derives conditions for when trading fossil fuel deposits increase efficiency. In isolation, a bilateral transaction may occur too often or too seldom compared to the optimum. However, when the market clears, the above-mentioned problems vanish, the first-best is implemented, and the coalition finds it optimal to rely entirely on supply-side policies, which are simple to implement in practice. |
| 主题 | International Economics
; Globalization and International Relations
; Public Economics
; Taxation
; Environmental and Resource Economics
; Environment
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16119
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573793
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Bård Harstad. Buy coal? Deposit markets prevent carbon leakage. 2010.
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文件名：
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w16119.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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