全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Managing Markets for Toxic Assets

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w16145
来源ID	Working Paper 16145
	Managing Markets for Toxic Assets
	Christopher L. House; Yusufcan Masatlioglu
发表日期	2010-07-01
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	We present a model in which banks trade toxic assets to raise funds for investment. The toxic assets generate an adverse selection problem and, as a consequence, the interbank asset market provides insufficient liquidity to finance investment. While the best investments are fully funded, socially efficient projects with modest payoffs are not. Investment is inefficiently low because acquiring funding requires banks to sell high-quality assets for less than their "fair" value. We then consider whether equity injections and asset purchases can improve market outcomes. Equity injections do not improve liquidity and may be counterproductive as a policy for increasing investment. By allowing banks to fund investments without having to sell high-quality assets, equity injections reduce the number of high-quality assets traded and further contaminate the interbank market. Paradoxically, if equity injections are directed to firms with the greatest liquidity needs, the contamination effect causes investment to fall. In contrast, asset purchase programs, like the Public-Private Investment Program, often have favorable impacts on liquidity, investment and welfare.
主题	Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w16145
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573819
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Christopher L. House,Yusufcan Masatlioglu. Managing Markets for Toxic Assets. 2010.

条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小	资源类型	版本类型	开放类型	使用许可
w16145.pdf（493KB）	智库出版物		限制开放	CC BY-NC-SA	浏览