| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16176 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16176 |
| Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking | |
| Ing-Haw Cheng; Harrison Hong; Jose A. Scheinkman | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-07-08 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the relationship between compensation and risk-taking among finance firms using a neglected insight from principal-agent contracting with hidden action and risk-averse agents. If the sensitivity of pay to stock price or slope does not vary with stock price volatility, then total compensation has to increase with firm risk to satisfy as agent's individual rationality constraint. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find a correlation between total executive compensation, controlling for firm size, and risk measures such as firm beta, return volatility, and exposure to the ABX sub-prime index. There is no relationship between insider ownership, a proxy for slope, and these measures. Compensation and firm risk are not related to governance variables. They increasewith institutional investor ownership, which suggests that heterogeneous investors incentivize firms to take varying levels of risks. Our results hold for non-finance firms and point to newprincipal-agent contracting empirics. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16176 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573849 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ing-Haw Cheng,Harrison Hong,Jose A. Scheinkman. Yesterday's Heroes: Compensation and Creative Risk-Taking. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16176.pdf（367KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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