| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16185 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16185 |
| Preference Signaling in Matching Markets | |
| Peter Coles; Alexey Kushnir; Muriel Niederle | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-07-08 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many labor markets share three stylized facts: employers cannot give full attention to all candidates, candidates are ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of workers and the number of matches, while the change in firm welfare is ambiguous. A signaling mechanism adds the most value for balanced markets. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Labor Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16185 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573858 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Peter Coles,Alexey Kushnir,Muriel Niederle. Preference Signaling in Matching Markets. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16185.pdf（481KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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