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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w16192 |
来源ID | Working Paper 16192 |
Rent-sharing, Holdup, and Wages: Evidence from Matched Panel Data | |
David Card; Francesco Devicienti; Agata Maida | |
发表日期 | 2010-07-15 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | When wage contracts are relatively short-lived, rent sharing may reduce the incentives for investment since some of the returns to sunk capital are captured by workers. In this paper we use a matched worker-firm data set from the Veneto region of Italy that combines Social Security earnings records for employees with detailed financial information for employers to measure the degree of rent sharing and test for holdup. We estimate wage models with job match effects, allowing us to control for any permanent differences in productivity across workers, firms, and job matches. We also compare OLS and instrumental variables specifications that use sales of firms in other regions of the country to instrument value-added per worker. We find strong evidence of rent-sharing, with a "Lester range" of variation in wages between profitable and unprofitable firms of around 10%. On the other hand we find little evidence that bargaining lowers the return to investment. Instead, firm-level bargaining in Veneto appears to split the rents after deducting the full cost of capital. Our findings are consistent with a dynamic bargaining model (Crawford, 1988) in which workers pay up front for the returns to sunk capital they will capture in later periods. |
主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16192 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573866 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | David Card,Francesco Devicienti,Agata Maida. Rent-sharing, Holdup, and Wages: Evidence from Matched Panel Data. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | ||||||
文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w16192.pdf(238KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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