| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16210 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16210 |
| A Litner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents | |
| Bart M. Lambrecht; Stewart C. Myers | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-07-22 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a dynamic agency model where payout, investment and financing decisions are made by managers who attempt to maximize the rents they take from the firm, subject to a capital market constraint. Managers smooth payout in order to smooth their flow of rents. Total payout (dividends plus net repurchases) follows Lintner's (1956) target-adjustment model. Payout smooths out transitory shocks to current income and adjusts gradually to changes in permanent income. Smoothing is accomplished by borrowing or lending. Payout is not cut back to finance capital investment. Risk aversion causes managers to underinvest, but habit formation mitigates the degree of underinvestment. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16210 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573885 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Bart M. Lambrecht,Stewart C. Myers. A Litner Model of Payout and Managerial Rents. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16210.pdf（519KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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