| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w16235
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16235
|
| The Corrective Tax versus Liability As Solutions to the Problem of Harmful Externalities |
| Steven Shavell
|
| 发表日期 | 2010-07-27
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| 出版年 | 2010
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| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | Although the corrective tax has long been viewed by economists as a theoretically desirable remedy for the problem of harmful externalities, its actual use has been limited, mainly to the domain of pollution. Liability, in contrast, has great importance in controlling harmful externalities. I compare the tax and liability here in theory and suggest that the conclusions help to explain the observed predominance of liability over taxation, except in the area of pollution. The following factors are emphasized in the analysis: inefficiency of incentives under taxes when, as would be typical, it would be impractical for the state to incorporate into taxes all of the variables that significantly affect expected harm; efficiency of incentives under strict liability, which requires only that actual harms be measured; efficiency of incentives to exercise precautions under the negligence rule; administrative cost advantages of liability deriving from its being applied only when harm occurs; and dilution of incentives under liability when suit would be unlikely or injurers would not be able to pay fully for harms caused. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
; Taxation
; Other
; Law and Economics
; Environmental and Resource Economics
; Environment
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16235
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573910
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Steven Shavell. The Corrective Tax versus Liability As Solutions to the Problem of Harmful Externalities. 2010.
|
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文件名：
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w16235.pdf
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格式：
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Adobe PDF
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