| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16279 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16279 |
| Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry | |
| C. Kirabo Jackson; Henry S. Schneider | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-08-19 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This study investigates the role of social networks in aligning the incentives of economic agents in settings with incomplete contracts. We study the New York City taxi industry where taxis are often leased and lessee-drivers have worse driving outcomes than owner-drivers as a result of a moral hazard associated with incomplete leasing contracts. Using instrumental variables and fixed-effects analyses, we find that: (1) drivers leasing from members of their country-of-birth community exhibit significantly reduced effects of moral hazard; (2) network effects appear to operate primarily via social sanctions; and (3) network benefits can help to explain the organization of the industry in terms of which drivers and owners form business relationships. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; General Equilibrium ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Market Structures |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16279 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573952 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | C. Kirabo Jackson,Henry S. Schneider. Do Social Connections Reduce Moral Hazard? Evidence from the New York City Taxi Industry. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16279.pdf（454KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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