| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16303 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16303 |
| Regulatory Choice with Pollution and Innovation | |
| Charles D. Kolstad | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-08-27 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper develops a simple model of a polluting industry and an innovating firm. The polluting industry is faced with regulation and costly abatement. Regulation may be taxes or marketable permits. The innovating firm invests in R&D and develops technologies which reduce the cost of pollution abatement. The innovating firm can patent this innovation and use a licensing fee to generate revenue. In a world of certainty, the first best level of innovation and abatement can be supported by either a pollution tax or a marketable permit. However, the returns to the innovator from innovation are not the same under the two regimes. A marketable permit system allows the innovator to capture all of the gains to innovation; a tax system involves sharing the gains of innovation between the innovator and the polluting industry. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Regulatory Economics ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16303 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573977 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Charles D. Kolstad. Regulatory Choice with Pollution and Innovation. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16303.pdf（219KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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