| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16315 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16315 |
| Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes | |
| Alessandra Casella; Aniol Llorente-Saguer; Thomas R. Palfrey | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-08-27 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a competitive equilibrium theory of a market for votes. Before voting on a binary issue, individuals may buy and sell their votes with each other. We define the concept of Ex Ante Vote-Trading Equilibrium, identify weak sufficient conditions for existence, and construct one such equilibrium. We show that this equilibrium must always result in dictatorship and the market generates welfare losses, relative to simple majority voting, if the committee is large enough. We test the theoretical implications by implementing a competitive vote market in the laboratory using a continuous open-book multi-unit double auction. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16315 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573989 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alessandra Casella,Aniol Llorente-Saguer,Thomas R. Palfrey. Competitive Equilibrium in Markets for Votes. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16315.pdf（410KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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