| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16321 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16321 |
| Bundling Among Rivals: A Case of Pharmaceutical Cocktails | |
| Claudio Lucarelli; Sean Nicholson; Minjae Song | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-08-27 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We empirically analyze the welfare effects of cross-firm bundling in the pharmaceutical industry. Physicians often treat patients with "cocktail" regimens that combine two or more drugs. Firms cannot price discriminate because each drug is produced by a different firm and a physician creates the bundle in her office from the component drugs. We show that a less competitive equilibrium arises with cocktail products because firms can internalize partially the externality their pricing decisions impose on competitors. The incremental profits from creating a bundle are sometimes as large as the incremental profits from a merger of the same two firms. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16321 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/573995 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Claudio Lucarelli,Sean Nicholson,Minjae Song. Bundling Among Rivals: A Case of Pharmaceutical Cocktails. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16321.pdf（346KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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