G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w16325
来源IDWorking Paper 16325
Competition and the Ratchet Effect
Gary Charness; Peter Kuhn; Marie-Claire Villeval
发表日期2010-09-02
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要In labor markets, the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance pay choose to restrict their output, because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond to higher output levels by raising output requirements or cutting pay. We model this effect as a multi-period principal-agent problem with hidden information, and study its robustness to labor market competition both theoretically and experimentally. Consistent with our theoretical model, we observe substantial ratchet effects in the absence of competition, which is nearly eliminated when competition is introduced; this is true regardless of whether market conditions favor firms or workers.
主题Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w16325
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574000
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Gary Charness,Peter Kuhn,Marie-Claire Villeval. Competition and the Ratchet Effect. 2010.
条目包含的文件
文件名称/大小 资源类型 版本类型 开放类型 使用许可
w16325.pdf(288KB)智库出版物 限制开放CC BY-NC-SA浏览
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Gary Charness]的文章
[Peter Kuhn]的文章
[Marie-Claire Villeval]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Gary Charness]的文章
[Peter Kuhn]的文章
[Marie-Claire Villeval]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Gary Charness]的文章
[Peter Kuhn]的文章
[Marie-Claire Villeval]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享
文件名: w16325.pdf
格式: Adobe PDF
此文件暂不支持浏览

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。