| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16339 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16339 |
| Overcoming the common pool problem through voluntary cooperation: the rise and fall of a fishery cooperative | |
| Robert T. Deacon; Dominic P. Parker; Christopher Costello | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-09-02 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We analyze a seldom used, but highly promising form of rights-based management over common pool resources that involves the self-selection of heterogeneous fishermen into sectors. The fishery management regime assigns one portion of an overall catch quota to a voluntary cooperative, with the remainder exploited as a commons by those choosing to fish independently. Data from an Alaska commercial salmon fishery confirm our model's key predictions, that the co-op would facilitate the consolidation of fishing effort, coordination of harvest activities, sharing of information and provision of shared infrastructure. We estimate that the resulting rent gains were at least 25%. A lawsuit filed by two disgruntled independents led to the co-op's demise, an outcome also predicted by our model. Our analysis provides guidance for designing fishery reform that leads to Pareto improvements for fishermen of all skill levels, which suggests a structure that enables reform without losers. |
| 主题 | Environmental and Resource Economics ; Renewable Resources |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16339 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574014 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert T. Deacon,Dominic P. Parker,Christopher Costello. Overcoming the common pool problem through voluntary cooperation: the rise and fall of a fishery cooperative. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16339.pdf（365KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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