| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16365 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16365 |
| The Lessons from the Banking Panics in the United States in the 1930s for the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 | |
| Michael D. Bordo; John Landon-Lane | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-09-16 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In this paper we revisit the debate over the role of the banking panics in 1930-33 in precipitating the Great Contraction. The issue hinges over whether the panics were illiquidity shocks and hence in support of Friedman and Schwartz (1963) greatly exacerbated the recession which had begun in 1929, or whether they largely reflected insolvency in response to the recession caused by other forces. Based on a VAR and new data on the sources of bank failures in the 1930s from Richardson (2007), we find that illiquidity shocks played a key role in explaining the bank failures during the Friedman and Schwartz banking panic windows. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Monetary Policy ; History ; Macroeconomic History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16365 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574040 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Michael D. Bordo,John Landon-Lane. The Lessons from the Banking Panics in the United States in the 1930s for the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16365.pdf（477KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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