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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w16411
来源IDWorking Paper 16411
Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents
Daron Acemoglu; Dan Vu Cao
发表日期2010-09-30
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We extend the basic Schumpeterian endogenous growth model by allowing incumbents to undertake innovations to improve their products, while entrants engage in more "radical" innovations to replace incumbents. Our model provides a tractable framework for the analysis of growth driven by both entry of new firms and productivity improvements by continuing firms. Unlike in the basic Schumpeterian models, subsidies to potential entrants might decrease economic growth because they discourage productivity improvements by incumbents in response to reduced entry, which may outweigh the positive effect of greater creative destruction. As the model features entry of new firms and expansion and exit of existing firms, it also generates a non-degenerate equilibrium firm size distribution. We show that, when there is also costly imitation preventing any sector from falling too far below the average, the stationary firm size distribution is Pareto with an exponent approximately equal to one (the so-called "Zipf distribution").
主题Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w16411
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574086
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GB/T 7714
Daron Acemoglu,Dan Vu Cao. Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents. 2010.
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