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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w16411 |
来源ID | Working Paper 16411 |
Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents | |
Daron Acemoglu; Dan Vu Cao | |
发表日期 | 2010-09-30 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We extend the basic Schumpeterian endogenous growth model by allowing incumbents to undertake innovations to improve their products, while entrants engage in more "radical" innovations to replace incumbents. Our model provides a tractable framework for the analysis of growth driven by both entry of new firms and productivity improvements by continuing firms. Unlike in the basic Schumpeterian models, subsidies to potential entrants might decrease economic growth because they discourage productivity improvements by incumbents in response to reduced entry, which may outweigh the positive effect of greater creative destruction. As the model features entry of new firms and expansion and exit of existing firms, it also generates a non-degenerate equilibrium firm size distribution. We show that, when there is also costly imitation preventing any sector from falling too far below the average, the stationary firm size distribution is Pareto with an exponent approximately equal to one (the so-called "Zipf distribution"). |
主题 | Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16411 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574086 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Daron Acemoglu,Dan Vu Cao. Innovation by Entrants and Incumbents. 2010. |
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文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
w16411.pdf(497KB) | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 |
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