| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16413 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16413 |
| Regulation Versus Taxation | |
| Alberto F. Alesina; Francesco Passarelli | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-09-30 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study which policy tool and at what level a majority chooses in order to reduce activities with negative externalities. We consider three instruments: a rule, that sets an upper limit to the activity which produces the negative externality, a quota that forces a proportional reduction of the activity, and a proportional tax on it. For all instruments the majority chooses levels which are too restrictive when the activity is performed mainly by a small fraction of the population, and when costs for reducing activities or paying taxes are sufficiently convex. Also a majority may prefer an instrument different than what a social planner would choose; for instance a rule when the social planner would choose a tax. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16413 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574088 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto F. Alesina,Francesco Passarelli. Regulation Versus Taxation. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16413.pdf（286KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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