| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16530 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16530 |
| Candidates, Character, and Corruption | |
| B. Douglas Bernheim; Navin Kartik | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-11-18 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the characteristics of self-selected candidates in corrupt political systems. Potential candidates differ along two dimensions of unobservable character: public spirit (altruism toward others) and honesty (the disutility suffered when selling out to special interests after securing office). Both aspects combine to determine an individual's quality as governor. We characterize properties of equilibrium candidate pools for arbitrary costs of running for office, including the case where those costs become vanishingly small. We explore how policy instruments such as the governor's compensation and anti-corruption enforcement affect the expected quality of governance through candidate self-selection. We also show that self-selection can have surprising implications for the effect of information disclosures concerning candidates' backgrounds. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16530 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574205 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | B. Douglas Bernheim,Navin Kartik. Candidates, Character, and Corruption. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16530.pdf（362KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
