| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16542 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16542 |
| Embezzlement Versus Bribery | |
| C. Simon Fan; Chen Lin; Daniel Treisman | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-11-18 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Corrupt officials can use their positions to enrich themselves in two ways. They can steal from the state budget--embezzling or misspending funds--or they can demand extra payments from citizens in return for services--bribery. In many circumstances, embezzlement is less distortionary than bribery. We analyze the tradeoff for governments in deciding how strictly to monitor and punish these two kinds of bureaucratic misbehavior. When bribery is more costly to economic development, governments may tolerate some embezzlement in order to reduce the extent of bribery--even though embezzlement is generally easier to detect. Embezzlement serves as a parallel to the "efficiency wage." This logic appears to hold in China, where misappropriation of public funds by officials appears to be ubiquitous. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16542 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574217 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | C. Simon Fan,Chen Lin,Daniel Treisman. Embezzlement Versus Bribery. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16542.pdf（288KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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