| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16568 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16568 |
| Valuing Identity | |
| Roland G. Fryer, Jr.; Glenn Loury | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-02 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Affirmative action policies are practiced around the world. This paper explores the welfare economics of such policies. A model is proposed where heterogeneous agents, distinguished by skill level and social identity, compete for positions in a hierarchy. The problem of designing an efficient policy to raise the status in this competition of a disadvantaged identity group is considered. We show that: (i) when agent identity is fully visible and contractible (sightedness), efficient policy grants preferred access to positions, but offers no direct assistance for acquiring skills; and, (ii) when identity is not contractible (blindness), efficient policy provides universal subsidies when the fraction of the disadvantaged group at the development margin is larger then their mean (across positions) share at the assignment margin. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16568 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574243 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Roland G. Fryer, Jr.,Glenn Loury. Valuing Identity. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16568.pdf（288KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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