| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16574 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16574 |
| The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value | |
| Vicente Cuñat; Mireia Gine; Maria Guadalupe | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-02 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper estimates the effect of corporate governance provisions on shareholder value and long-term outcomes in S&P1500 firms. We apply a regression discontinuity design to shareholder votes on governance proposals in annual meetings. A close-call vote around the majority threshold is akin to a random outcome, allowing us to deal with prior expectations and the endogeneity of internal governance rules. Passing a corporate governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of the vote with an implied market value per provision of 2.8%. We also find evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance improvements. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16574 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574249 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Vicente Cuñat,Mireia Gine,Maria Guadalupe. The Vote is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16574.pdf（917KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
