| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16585 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16585 |
| CEO Compensation | |
| Carola Frydman; Dirk Jenter | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-02 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper surveys the recent literature on CEO compensation. The rapid rise in CEO pay over the past 30 years has sparked an intense debate about the nature of the pay-setting process. Many view the high level of CEO compensation as the result of powerful managers setting their own pay. Others interpret high pay as the result of optimal contracting in a competitive market for managerial talent. We describe and discuss the empirical evidence on the evolution of CEO pay and on the relationship between pay and firm performance since the 1930s. Our review suggests that both managerial power and competitive market forces are important determinants of CEO pay, but that neither approach is fully consistent with the available evidence. We briefly discuss promising directions for future research. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Labor Economics ; Labor Compensation ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16585 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574260 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Carola Frydman,Dirk Jenter. CEO Compensation. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16585.pdf（157KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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