| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16586 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16586 |
| The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky Borrowers | |
| Christopher J. Mayer; Tomasz Piskorski; Alexei Tchistyi | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-02 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper explores the practice of mortgage refinancing in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. We show that prepayment penalties improve welfare by ensuring longer-term lending contracts, which prevents the mortgage pools from becoming disproportionately composed of the riskiest borrowers over time. Mortgages with prepayment penalties allow lenders to lower mortgage rates and extend credit to the least creditworthy, with the largest benefits going to the riskiest borrowers, who have the most incentive to refinance in response to positive credit shocks. Empirical evidence from more than 21,000 non-agency securitized fixed rate mortgages is consistent with the key predictions of our model. Our results suggest that regulations banning refinancing penalties might have the unintended consequence of restricting access to credit and raising rates for the least creditworthy borrowers. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; General Equilibrium ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Regional and Urban Economics ; Real Estate |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16586 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574261 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christopher J. Mayer,Tomasz Piskorski,Alexei Tchistyi. The Inefficiency of Refinancing: Why Prepayment Penalties Are Good for Risky Borrowers. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16586.pdf（698KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
