| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w16620 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 16620 |
| A Behavioral Model of Demandable Deposits and its Implications for Financial Regulation | |
| Julio J. Rotemberg | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-12-16 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A model is developed which rationalizes contracts that give depositors the right to obtain funds on demand even when depositors intend to use these funds for consumption in the future. This is explained by depositor overoptimism regarding their own ability to collect funds in a run. Capitalized institutions serving depositors with such beliefs emerge in equilibrium even if depositors and bank owners have the same preferences and the same investment opportunities. Various government regulations of these institutions, including minimum capital levels, requirements concerning the assets they may hold, deposit insurance and compulsory clawbacks in bankruptcy can raise the average ex post welfare of depositors. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Corporate Finance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w16620 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/574295 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Julio J. Rotemberg. A Behavioral Model of Demandable Deposits and its Implications for Financial Regulation. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w16620.pdf（347KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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